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Syria’s Reconstruction Scramble 
In a Game Fraught with Political Risk, Europe Should Aim for Long-term Stabilization 
Muriel Asseburg and Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
By November 2017, as the civil war abated and the so-called Islamic State (IS) was all but 
defeated, Moscow increased its efforts to reach what it regards as conflict resolution in 
several fora beyond the UN-led Geneva process. Moreover, as the US administration made 
it clear that it would not be engaging in reconstruction efforts, Russia has sought Euro-
pean financial assistance to help cover the costs of rebuilding the country, together 
with Arab Gulf states. Although the European Union had, in April 2017, ruled out sup-
port for reconstruction without a political transition, calls have now been mounting 
in Europe to accommodate Bashar al-Assad, help in the reconstruction of Syria, and 
send back refugees. Yet, the fighting is far from over. More importantly, the mere recon-
struction of physical infrastructure would do little to instill stability, but would rather 
raise the risk of fueling new conflicts. Europeans should therefore make clear to Russia 
that they will stick with their own approach. They should play the long game and devel-
op leverage to make future contributions serve state- and peace-building purposes. Mean-
while, they should focus on increased levels of humanitarian aid, early recovery measures, 
such as de-mining and restoring basic water and health infrastructure, building human 
capital in Syria and among Syrian refugee communities, in addition to concentrating 
on civil society and local governance support where they have credible partners. 
 
By late 2017, the Syrian regime and its 
allies had regained control over most of 
the urban centers in the country, and the 
Caliphate proclaimed by the IS had lost all 
but its territorial base. The rebels had been 
mainly squeezed into several pockets but 
were still holding onto strategic junctures 
and main border crossings. At the same 
time, ever since its direct military involve-
ment in Syria, Russia has developed into 
the dominant military force. Moscow has 
been keen to translate that achievement 
into taking the lead on the diplomatic 
stage and acting as mediator in the conflict. 
Washington, whose interest in Syria since 
2014 has been limited largely to combating 
the IS, has been unwilling to challenge the 
Russian approach. Nor has it shown willing-
ness to contribute meaningfully to Syria’s 
reconstruction after its heavy bombing of 
Syria’s east. Russian bombardment, espe-
cially of Aleppo in 2016, caused wide-scale 
destruction, drawing strong EU condem-
nation for the “deliberate targeting of hos-
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pitals, medical personnel, schools and 
essential infrastructure.” Yet, Moscow has 
turned to Europe for reconstruction sup-
port while chiding European countries for 
linking reconstruction to a political tran-
sition and predicted the conflict would 
soon be over. De-escalation was portrayed 
as having created the “de facto conditions” 
for full-scale reconstruction in Syria. Today’s 
reality, however, looks different, with con-
trol still very much fragmented between a 
variety of forces on the ground in the de-
escalation zones, the territories liberated 
from the IS, the areas controlled by the 
Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), as 
well as those areas under the control of 
the regime and its allies – with the fighting 
doing anything but drawing to a close. 
De-escalation Zones 
Moscow first used its military backing 
mainly to help the regime and its allies 
reconquer territories. Over the course of 
2017, it aimed at reducing the levels of 
violence through a new approach that was 
to prepare the ground for pacification. In 
this vein, in the Kazakhstani capital, Astana, 
in May 2017, Russia agreed with Turkey 
and Iran on so-called de-escalation zones 
in regions held by various rebel forces. The 
deal was supposed to result in a halt to 
fighting in places where the revolt had 
not been crushed, offering the possibility 
of sustained humanitarian relief and the 
restoration of basic services (see Box 1). 
In reality, the zones have evolved to pre-
sent an array of local situations: from im-
proved living conditions to the continued 
siege and massive carnage caused by the 
regime’s and Russia’s bombings of civilian 
targets in areas that Moscow had marked 
as being part of the de-escalation zones. For 
Assad, the zones were considered to be a 
temporary arrangement, if at all, and were 
to follow the path of other besieged areas 
that the regime had captured after “terror-
ists” (which is the regime’s term for all 
rebels) were given the chance to disarm 
and “return to the bosom of the state.” 
Box 1: The Astana Agreement 
Signed in May 2017, the Russia–Iran–
Turkey deal stipulated ceasefires in 
four de-escalation zones, the halt of air-
strikes, “rapid, safe, and unhindered” 
humanitarian access, the restoration 
of basic infrastructure, and the cre-
ation of conditions for the voluntary 
return of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). The fight against jihadists would 
still continue in the zones, with attacks 
on the IS and HTS, an al-Qaeda offshoot, 
being exempted from the ceasefires. 
The zones comprise: 
1. the north: Idlib province and parts 
of Aleppo, Latakia, and Hama gover-
norates on the border with Turkey; 
2. Homs: rural areas north of the city 
of Homs; 
3. the Eastern Ghouta, i.e., the eastern 
suburbs of Damascus; and 
4. a southwestern zone in areas adja-
cent to Jordan and the Israeli-occu-
pied Golan Heights. 
Out of the four zones, the Damascus and 
Homs zones in the center of the country 
have been besieged by the regime. The 
three guarantors were to deploy military 
observers to see through the implemen-
tation of the ceasefire agreements. 
Makings of a Mini-recovery 
At the same time, bombing and sieges on 
areas in other zones abated, most notably 
in the countryside near Homs and in the 
southern governorate of Deraa. The window 
of temporary stability spurred fairly brisk 
activity in the private construction sphere. 
For example, some residents in rural Homs 
moved back to their hometowns from camps 
on nearby farmlands and started to repair 
or rebuild their houses. Mud is reportedly 
being used instead of concrete, as prices 
for construction materials imported from 
regime areas remain high. The cost of most 
other goods and staples, such as sugar and 
rice, has fallen since the de-escalation deal 
came into effect in August 2017, breaking 
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the monopolies of local traders, who had 
enjoyed a captive market. Two crossings 
with the regime opened, increasing the 
overall level of supplies. An export market 
slowly opened, too. Rebel areas sent sheep 
and cattle to regime areas, and the number 
of farmers who planned to plant crops 
increased, as they expected large enough 
sales to make a profit. 
The potential of improved access could 
also rejuvenate the local councils, which 
activists had set up during the revolt to 
replace the regime’s administration after 
Assad’s forces withdrew from rebellious 
areas. The councils in rural Homs are now 
seeking to link up with donors and with 
the opposition’s interim government. At 
the same time, the siege of the region may 
have been a blessing in disguise for the 
local structures, isolating them from out-
side meddling. In the southern governorate 
of Deraa, local activists see the reach of 
Jordan and other Arab countries as having 
tainted local governance structures. Figures 
linked to third countries penetrated or 
took over many of the local councils, under-
mining their merit and competence. 
Al-Qaeda Lurks 
Apart from continued regime bombings 
and the threat of the regime attempting to 
reconquer further rebel areas, the highest 
hurdles to potential reconstruction in the 
de-escalation zones come from within. By 
August 2017, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, 
or the Association for the Liberation of the 
Levant) – an offshoot of al-Qaeda and suc-
cessor of the Nusra Front – all but finished 
off its Salafist rival, Ahrar al-Sham, and 
took control over most of Idlib province. 
The area of influence of HTS also includ-
ed the main border crossing with Turkey, 
through which flows humanitarian aid and 
infrastructure supplies. Borrowing from 
Lenin’s dictum of “peace, land and bread,” 
HTS took over the bakeries in the various 
towns across Idlib, many of which relied on 
Western programs for wheat supply. Keen 
to build up legitimacy with the local popu-
lation and be seen as succeeding in govern-
ance, HTS indicated that it would not pre-
vent outside assistance to Idlib. 
At the same time, the group had its 
hand in many of the local administrative 
structures, as well as schools, charities, and 
refugee camps, without necessarily staffing 
them outright with its members or conspicu-
ously patrolling them. HTS also dissolved 
local councils or ousted council members 
who were critical of the group. In addition, 
they co-opted existing supervisory bodies, 
such as the Idlib Administrative Board, or 
nudged civilian allies to set up new ones. 
Among them is the so-called Syrian Salva-
tion Government, formed in November 
2017, with the apparent aim of displacing 
the opposition’s interim government. Many 
qualified cadres in the various local admin-
istrations of Idlib remained in their posts 
despite their distaste of HTS. They preferred 
to hold onto their jobs and their links to 
donors to keep aid deliveries going. 
Western support for Idlib’s population, 
in contrast, abated markedly after HTS’ 
takeover, as foreign donors were anxious 
about indirectly supporting the group or 
its front organizations. Activists had hoped 
that the entry of Turkish troops into Idlib 
in October 2017 would roll back HTS. The 
Turkish show of force was mandated by the 
implementation of the northern de-escala-
tion zone foreseen in the Astana agreement. 
Yet, it was aimed at the Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) militia, which is 
linked to the PYD, a Syrian offshoot of the 
Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 
the nearby region of Afrin; this was done 
with the goal of preventing a contiguous 
Kurdish self-administration zone along the 
Turkish border. 
The risk, however, of renewed warfare 
in the zone remains high, with Turkey 
and Iran raising the tone of their assertive 
rhetoric. Ankara, boosted by its newfound 
understandings with Russia, said it needed 
to clear Afrin of the YPG. Iran, in turn, in-
dicated that the Assad regime would soon 
overrun Idlib to fight the jihadists there. 
The mostly Kurdish Afrin region has an 
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estimated 300,000 inhabitants living in 20 
cities and towns, whereas Idlib province has 
an estimated two million people, of whom 
one-third have been displaced there from 
other provinces. They settled in Idlib after 
fleeing fighting elsewhere in the country 
because Turkey had closed its border to 
refugees. Also, thousands of rebel fighters, 
their families, and other civilians were 
transported to the province in the regime’s 
“green buses,” which became synonymous 
with the population transfers that accom-
panied rebel surrenders in besieged areas 
under so-called reconciliation agreements. 
Kurdish Expansion 
Signs have emerged of an overreach by the 
PYD, in particular after the United States 
encouraged the capture of mostly Arab-
inhabited territories in eastern Syria from 
the IS by the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF), which are dominated by the YPG, 
the PYD’s fighters. In addition, the PYD’s 
declared goal of linking two contiguous 
self-rule areas (the so-called cantons of 
Jazeera and Kobanê) with the Afrin canton 
also appeared to be farfetched. By late 2017, 
it became clear that the United States (and 
Russia) would not back the Syrian Kurds’ 
political ambitions against Turkey beyond 
combating the IS; nor would Russia prevent 
the regime from recapturing territories 
liberated from the IS. 
The PYD has set up local governance 
structures in these areas. Although these 
structures of “people’s democracy” are 
nominally independent and inclusive, the 
PYD remains the power behind the scenes. 
One such arrangement has been installed 
in the mostly Arab town of Manbij, which 
the YPG captured from the IS in August 
2016. The PYD appointed Farouk al-Mashi, a 
tribal figure, as the joint head of the Manbij 
City Council. The appointment invited scorn 
by opposition activists on social media, who 
compared the PYD’s methods of coercion 
and control to that of the regime. They also 
pointed out that al-Mashi was the son of 
Diab al-Mashi, a member of the rubber 
stamp Syrian parliament from 1954 till 
his death in 2009. 
Pay-up Time for the Regime 
Even though the Assad regime by no means 
controlled the entirety of Syria’s territory, 
it sensed the winds in its favor. It sought 
to employ reconstruction to placate its con-
stituencies and compensate for the thou-
sands who had died fighting for Assad. At 
the opening of the Damascus International 
Trade Fair in August 2017, an Assad aide 
said Syria had “made a U-turn” and was 
on the path of rebuilding. The regime por-
trayed reconstruction as a done deal and 
announced that no contracts would go 
to countries that had supported what it 
regards as terrorism. 
Domestically, the authorities indicated 
that the rebuilding effort would reward 
mainly Assad’s loyalists; it was not an at-
tempt to mitigate the grievances that had 
fueled the revolt by addressing issues 
related to institutional legitimacy and 
capacity, justice, and political and social 
inclusion. At an official rally in November 
2017 – held to mark the coup that brought 
Hafez al-Assad to power more than four 
decades earlier – a senior Baath Party opera-
tive boasted that Syria would be “built with 
the hands of its honorable sons.” The rally 
was held in Homs, from which the regime 
and Iran-backed militias had displaced hun-
dreds of thousands of mainly Sunni inhabit-
ants as they crushed the rebellion there. Of 
the 8 billion Syrian pounds ($15.5 million) 
that the government announced in July 
2017 would be allocated to projects in Homs 
governorate, most of it went to Alawite and 
Christian communities as opposed to Sunni 
areas destroyed by regime bombing. 
So far, the regime has, at least on paper, 
awarded projects to its cronies and struck 
initial agreements with Iran and Russia. 
The deals range from residential towers and 
a shopping center to be built on bulldozed 
homes in Damascus that had belonged to 
pro-democracy demonstrators, to a cell-
phone license and oil refinery in Homs, and 
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energy and mining concessions in eastern 
Syria. The regime apparently hopes to play 
the external powers against each other in 
the hopes that they will cough up the cash 
for hardcore infrastructure projects requir-
ing long-term investment. 
International Blueprints 
As the civil war in Syria was seen as com-
ing to an end, UN agencies, development 
organizations, and international finance 
institutions have drawn up a wealth of 
reconstruction blueprints for the country. 
According to UN estimates, reconstruction 
would cost at least $250 billion. 
Governance issues 
What unites most of these plans, however, 
is that they deal with reconstruction mostly 
as if it were a technical issue, whereas not 
much attention is being paid to the kind 
of governance system under which it is sup-
posed to take place. Rather, a competent 
central authority oriented toward the pub-
lic good – able and willing to engage in an 
equitable restoration of human capital and 
the social fabric – is just assumed. 
Also, these plans do not detail how a 
competitive business environment would 
be instilled – under the same regime that 
deprived most Syrians of equal opportunity 
for decades. With the courts and bureau-
cracy beholden to the kleptocracy, foreign 
companies have barely been able to operate 
in Syria or to win or execute major con-
tracts without partnering with the ruling 
elites or their agents. If anyone who is 
not in league with the regime comes close 
to winning a tender, rules are arbitrarily 
changed and they are disqualified. Cartels 
and rackets run by the top tiers of the secu-
rity apparatus abound. The judiciary and 
regulatory bodies are massively rigged. 
Ministries and the central bank act as pri-
vate instruments for the Makhloufs, who 
are Assad’s cousins on his mother’s side. 
The Makhloufs and two other branches of 
the Assad family have the public tenders 
and procurement system locked up be-
tween them. 
Fragmentation 
What is more, most of these plans assume 
that Syria would work as a unitary state 
and do not account for the fragmentation 
that has resulted from the civil war. The 
fluidity of local dynamics, the emergence 
of new power brokers, and militia rule are 
all ignored. Among the forces that emerged 
during the civil war is a new breed of crony 
capitalists, shaping the business environ-
ment and poised to obstruct – together with 
more established regime business figures – 
any reconstruction that is not in their favor. 
Also linked to the war economy are jihad-
ists and other militia seeking to maximize 
their returns. In regime areas, organized 
crime and gang violence linked to various 
pro-Assad militia have spiked. Loyalists 
have targeted other loyalists in their quest 
for loot while cutting off roads and impos-
ing tolls. 
Third parties’ motives 
International reconstruction blueprints 
also take for granted cooperation between 
third countries for the good of Syria. In 
reality, however, many of the regional and 
international players see reconstruction 
as a means to consolidate their presence 
in Syria in the long term and as a tool to 
assert their (vital) interests in the broader 
power struggles of the Middle East. They 
also tend to focus on their immediate inter-
ests, such as quick financial returns or 
alleviating themselves of Syrian refugees. 
The regime reportedly promised at least 
one Russian company linked to Russian 
security contractors a quarter of the oil and 
gas in the fields captured from the IS. Iran 
has encouraged private investment in real 
estate in Syria and signed memorandums of 
understanding for reconstruction in Aleppo 
as well as the restoration of mobile commu-
nications, which would bring in revenues 
and give them a surveillance edge. Ankara, 
SWP Comments 51 
December 2017 
6 
officially shut out by the regime, has re-
paired basic infrastructure, schools, and a 
hospital in the Turkish-controlled enclave 
of al-Bab. Along with the more crucial ab-
sence of airstrikes, the rehabilitation has 
contributed to the return of some of the po-
pulation into the small enclave. China has 
said it would also get involved in reconstruc-
tion, but it has not provided any specifics. 
The European Union and the United 
States have invested billions of dollars 
in humanitarian aid and stabilization in 
opposition-held areas. The Europeans see 
their work in Syria as being different to 
that of the Americans, in that they gen-
erally aim at building streamlined insti-
tutions across a multitude of regions and 
support civil society, whereas the United 
States prefers to work with individual 
actors to set up and test organizations 
that would act as a role model to be fol-
lowed in other areas. 
Outlook, Risks, and Dilemmas 
for the EU 
Under various short- to mid-term scenarios, 
the violence is not expected to halt, and 
militia rule and the war economy are set to 
remain entrenched. Still, European policy-
makers are under pressure to focus on what 
can be done immediately to help foster 
a settlement and stabilize the region, not 
least in view of the urgency they feel due 
to rising populism in the EU and the pres-
sure to repatriate refugees. 
Assad will happily take more freebies 
from the EU. For the regime, reconstruc-
tion is to serve, first and foremost, its own 
consolidation as well as ensure the perma-
nenceof social and demographic shifts and 
strengthen the loyalty of its citizens. A view 
espoused by the Assad regime and echoed 
in international aid meetings warns that 
Europe will lose out to Moscow and Tehran 
unless European nations help in the recon-
struction of Syria. 
In April 2017, the EU ruled out engaging 
in reconstruction “until a comprehensive, 
genuine and inclusive political transition … 
is firmly under way.” Still, in practice, the 
European approach has been inconsistent – 
European countries have financed UN re-
building programs that work in collabora-
tion with the regime. The programs are 
ongoing or slated to start in regions where 
the dust has barely settled on forced popu-
lation transfers, such as in Homs. No safe-
guards were devised to ensure the right of 
return for the original inhabitants, the halt 
of the falsification of public records, or a 
reversal of the regime’s confiscation of 
property in rebel districts it had captured. 
Also, the EU has not made the departure of 
Assad a precondition for engaging in recon-
struction efforts. Rather, EU member states’ 
representatives have increasingly been 
acknowledging that Bashar al-Assad might 
well play a role in the transition period, 
and even beyond. EU member states have 
been divided between those taking a stance 
against any cooperation with what they 
regard as a regime that cannot be reformed, 
and those willing to placate Assad in the 
hope of quick stabilization or of opening 
up a supposedly lucrative reconstruction 
market to their companies and develop-
ment agencies. As a consequence, the EU 
has shied away from spelling out if a genu-
ine transition would be possible if Assad 
and his immediate entourage were to 
remain in power. 
Reconstruction thus poses a dilemma 
for the EU and its member states, as the 
chances for any real change to Syria’s 
authoritarian and repressive system are 
fading. Indeed, the Russian approach and 
the emergence of an emboldened Assad 
regime have complicated the realization of 
a European strategy on reconstruction (see 
Box 2). Moscow has portrayed its activities 
as being complementary to the UN Special 
Envoy’s efforts at achieving a negotiated con-
flict settlement based on the 2012 Geneva 
Agreement and UN Security Council Reso-
lution 2254 of December 2015. But the 
Russian way has actually undermined the 
approach and list of priorities agreed upon 
in Resolution 2254, the centerpiece of which 
was supposed to be a transitional governing 
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Box 2: The EU Strategy of April 2017 
The EU offers its support to Syria in fields 
such as security: disarmament, demobi-
lization, and reintegration (DDR), secu-
rity-sector reform (SSR), international 
monitoring; governance: constitutional 
process, elections, institutional reform; 
and peace-building: dealing with de-
tainees and missing persons, property-
dispute resolution, return of refugees/ 
IDPs, transitional justice, reconciliation. 
As a precondition for its engagement 
in reconstruction efforts and the lifting 
of sanctions against the regime, its insti-
tutions, and its representatives, the EU 
stipulates the existence of a “genuine 
and inclusive political transition, nego-
tiated by the Syrian parties in the con-
flict … under the auspices of the UN 
Special Envoy.” 
EU support will be undertaken “in an 
incremental way, and only in response 
to concrete and measurable progress” in 
this transition. The EU will not engage 
in early recovery or stabilization efforts 
that “could support social and demo-
graphic engineering.” The EU stresses 
that “special responsibility for the costs 
of reconstruction should also be taken 
by those who have fueled the conflict.” 
 
body – comprised of regime and opposition 
representatives – with full authority. Rather, 
Russia has sought legitimization of the Assad 
regime by leading a process of limited re-
form – including the adoption of a federal 
constitution, devised in Moscow – through 
a Conference of the Syrian Peoples or 
national dialogue conference, followed 
by elections. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The Russian-dominated conflict-settlement 
approach and the expected continued pres-
ence of Iran-backed militias is unlikely to 
bring about even a minimum of the secu-
rity, administrative, and economic reforms 
that would address Syria’s deep-rooted 
socio-economic and sectarian imbalances. 
Reconstruction cannot, as Russia implies, 
be reduced to the physical reconstruction 
of infrastructure and economic recovery. 
Rather, measures to safeguard citizens’ 
security, establish effective governance, 
and lay the ground for reconciliation are 
key for peace-building (see Box 3, p. 8). 
Under such circumstances, European 
involvement in reconstruction during 
the early phases runs the risk of feeding 
destructive dynamics and foregoing 
incentives for political settlements. The 
Europeans should therefore stick to 
the approach outlined in the April 2017 
strategy, and clearly say so. They should 
also gauge when to throw around their 
weight and leverage their diplomatic, 
financial, and technical support so as to 
achieve conditions under which recon-
struction would serve long-term stabiliza-
tion rather than lead to renewed violent 
conflict and radicalization. 
At a later stage – and because of the 
sheer amount of investment needed – the 
regime will not be able to depend only on 
its allies, as it has boasted. Rather, it might 
be forced to turn to Western, Gulf, and inter-
national sources of financing. That might 
be the starting point for pushing toward 
the realization of measures aimed at build-
ing credible institutions. One should not 
exaggerate the chances of success, though: 
Such a development is by no means guar-
anteed, as the regime might choose to con-
tinue defying European conditionality, 
even if it comes at the cost of massive North 
Korean-style human suffering. 
In the near future, some of the de-escala-
tion zones could become the settings for 
larger European efforts at recovery – under 
the condition that the arrangements stick, 
which is more likely for some areas (in the 
south and north of Homs) than for others 
(Eastern Ghouta and Idlib). The challenge 
in these zones is that some of the areas are 
controlled by forces that cannot be partners 
in reconstruction, such as al-Qaeda linked 
groups, meaning that support can only be  
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Box 3: Long-term Stabilization 
Experts widely agree that the following 
conditions need to be fulfilled to allow 
for reconstruction that serves peace-
building: 
1. an effective division of power with 
functioning checks and balances; the 
establishment of effective economic and 
administrative oversight bodies; 
2. large-scale demilitarization; an end 
to militia and warlord rule; establishing 
army and security services loyal to the 
state and its citizenry, not to the regime; 
comprehensive disarmament of militias; 
3. addressing forced displacement 
and expropriation of property; allowing 
for social reconciliation; 
4. an inclusive constitutional process 
in which majority and minority rights 
are respected; a political climate in which 
free and fair elections are possible, 
political rights are guaranteed, and civil 
society can operate. 
 
administered through civil society organi-
zations rather than the local councils and 
the interim government. Also, the rebels 
are often so fragmented in terms of actual 
control that no zone-wide de-escalation 
projects can be administered. 
Europeans will therefore have to look for 
tailor-made approaches, depending on the 
conditions and partners available in each 
of the areas. These approaches should focus 
on humanitarian aid, early recovery, and 
support for non-violent community-based 
organizations – not least to counter jihad-
ists’ propaganda and influence – as well 
as continued support for local governance, 
where possible. It is far-fetched to believe 
that with such kinds of support, one would 
be able to create “islands of stability,” 
which could be the basis for nation-wide 
stabilization. But Europeans should still 
strive toward helping local civilian and 
governance structures survive. 
Humanitarian aid, the provision of basic 
services, and support for civil society should 
also be the focus of European support in 
the PYD-controlled areas, where repression 
of opposition forces and independent activ-
ists and forced recruitment have become 
major problems, despite the progressive 
and inclusive image projected by the PYD. 
Last but not least, rather than thinking 
about sending refugees back to situations 
where their lives and existence are threat-
ened, Europeans should focus more on 
building Syria’s human resources in the 
neighboring countries and among the refu-
gee communities across Europe. 
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